




### Post-pandemic success: Economic damage from pandemic just about gone



Note: As of Apr 2022. Broad unemployment rate defined as U-6 unemployment rate. Shaded area represents recession. Source: BLS, Macrobond, RBC GAM



## Key economic forces for 2022 & 2023: a few positives, but plenty of big negatives

#### **Positive forces**

- Fewer pandemic restrictions
- Cap ex and hiring plans
- Resilient household finances
- Supply chain problems to ease somewhat



#### **Negative forces**

- Future pandemic waves
- Central bank rate hikes
- Fiscal drag
- China drag
- Inflation drag
- Russia-Ukraine war
- Tighter financial conditions

We anticipate decelerating growth in 2022, and a challenging 2023





### Our forecasts continue to be revised lower, and remain below the consensus

Forecast year	2022				2023			
GDP forecast		RBC GAM		RBC GAM vs. CE		RBC GAM		RBC GAM vs. CE
Forecast date	Q1 2022		Q2 2022	CE forecast, May 2022	Q1 2022		Q2 2022	CE forecast, May 2022
U.S.	3.1	<b>→</b> -0.5 <b>→</b>	2.6	-0.2	2.6	<b>→</b> -1.2 <b>→</b>	1.4	-0.7
Canada	3.1	<b>→</b> +0.4 <b>→</b>	3.5	-0.6	2.9	<b>→</b> -1.8 <b>→</b>	1.1	-1.5
Eurozone	3.0	<b>→</b> -0.5 <b>→</b>	2.5	-0.2	2.4	<b>→</b> -1.5 <b>→</b>	0.9	-1.3
U.K.	3.9	<b>→</b> -0.3 <b>→</b>	3.6	-0.2	2.9	<b>→</b> -2.1 <b>→</b>	8.0	-0.2
Japan	2.2	<b>→</b> -1.4 <b>→</b>	8.0	-1.2	1.9	<b>→</b> -0.7 <b>→</b>	1.2	-0.7
Developed countries	3.0	<b>→</b> -0.6 <b>→</b>	2.5	-0.3	2.5	<b>→</b> -1.3 <b>→</b>	1.2	-0.9
World	3.6	<b>→</b> -0.7 <b>→</b>	2.9	-0.4	3.6	<b>→</b> -1.1 <b>→</b>	2.5	-0.8

Note: RBC GAM forecast as of 5/28/2022. RBC GAM vs. CE calculated as RBC GAM forecast minus Consensus Economics (CE) forecast. Developed countries include U.S., Canada, Eurozone, U.K. and Japan. World includes developed countries aforementioned, China, India, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico and Russia. Source: CE, RBC GAM





### Economic scenarios for next two years

will be hard

#### Recession Growth Fabled "soft landing" Recession, but inflation fixed High probability Great outcome for markets Arguably a decent outcome Normalizing But requires a lot of things to for markets becomes less high inflation start going right Depends on recession depth Recession, yet still inflation Growth persists but inflation Small chance that Nightmare scenario problems not solved **Persistently** Need even higher rates Worse than top-right scenario high inflation Rates have to rise further **Sustaining growth** Elevated chance of




that inflation

inflation remains

structurally high


recession

## COVID-19 has faded globally and no longer restricting economy; there will be future waves, but likely of limited economic consequence






## Canadian businesses plan to invest and hire extensively – but this could be about to change






Consumer appetite for big-ticket items has seemingly crashed -But is this because of buyer fatigue (bad), consumers pivoting to services (good) or unavailability of the big-ticket goods they want (status-quo)?








### Economic momentum has suddenly turned negative





## Financial conditions tighten significantly – magnitude somewhere between mid-cycle slowdown and a recession





### Economic damage from Russia-Ukraine war is significant

#### **Ukraine**

- Economy 1/3 to 50%
   smaller than before war
- Serious damage to infrastructure
- Some cities under siege
- Men conscripted into war
- 7 million internally displaced people
- 5 million refugees have left Ukraine

#### Russia

- Primary damage via sanctions that limit trade, companies, flows
- War unlikely to end soon, and sanctions to remain
- Partial offset via higher commodity prices
- Economy likely shrinks
   10% in 2022
- Central bank raised rates aggressively
- Inflation to reach +20%


#### **Rest of World**

- Negative resource supply shock
- Risk that commodity flows are further impeded
- Russia/Ukraine export oil, gas, wheat, potash, nickel, neon, etc.
- Global economy 0.5% to 1.0% smaller than otherwise
- Euro GDP 1.5% to 3% smaller
- U.S. loses only moderately
- Canada loses very little
- Global inflation 2ppt higher






# Oil price increase has been smaller than expected — this constitutes an upside risk, especially if Europe blocks oil imports; A 2mb/d mismatch theoretically justifies oil closer to \$140






## Natural gas prices have spiked particularly high in Europe; still some upside risk as pipelines may be blocked








### Main supply chain issue: people are buying more goods than usual






### Supply chain getting slightly better, but still bad; Russian sanctions and China lockdown delay further improvement








## Potential headwind for goods sector and tailwind for services as consumers unwind pandemic and supply chain distortions








### Inflation to be very high in ST, fairly high in MT, a bit high in LT






## Inflation continues to surprise massively to the upside: winning bet has been above-consensus inflation





## U.S. inflation breadth: most components now rising at 5%+ rate – such breadth makes it hard to tame inflation





## Happily, inflation expectations have started to come down as central banks have promised rate hikes





### Inflation – 1970s versus today

#### **Similarities**

#### Problematic monetary policy

- Politicized in 1970s + bad policy (wage/price controls)
- Too many objectives today
- Major policy errors in both cases, allowing initial burst of high inflation

#### Expansive fiscal policy

- · Large deficits in both eras
- · Focus on expanding social safety net

#### Global economic boom

- · Initial inflation exacerbated by strong growth
- Bad luck
  - 1970s: crop failures, OPEC oil shocks
  - 2020s: pandemic, Ukraine war

#### **Differences**

#### Central banks better positioned today

- Explicitly target inflation, more transparent
- Good credibility after three decades of success
- Learned from 1970s
- Aggressively countering high inflation after <1 year</li>

#### Different types of shocks

- 1970s: skewed toward negative supply shocks
- 2020s: skewed toward positive demand shocks
- Positive demand shocks are less problematic

#### Worse setup in the 1970s

- Inflation was gradually rising for years beforehand
- End of gold standard and FX depreciation
- Higher unionization rate then
- Greater energy and food intensity then
- Very different demographics
- Giant central bank balance sheets today



### High inflation winners and losers

#### Losers

- Overall economy
- Borrowers at variable rate
- Companies with weak pricing power
- · Retirees on fixed income
- Investors in longer term bonds

#### **Mixed**

- Stock market
  - Likes rising earnings
  - Dislikes higher discount rate


#### Winners

- Real assets
  - Property
  - Precious metals
- Resource producers
- Companies with strong pricing power
- Retirees with indexed pensions
- Borrowers at fixed rate





## U.S. business cycle is still "mid cycle" but continues to move rapidly forward; significant "late cycle" and beyond claims now








## Central banks now tightening with unusual haste to dampen inflation = higher borrowing costs and prospect of economic slowdown

#### Bank of Canada expected to deliver further aggressive hikes




Jan-22 Feb-22Mar-22 Apr-22 May-22 Jun-22 Jul-22 Aug-22 Sep-22 Oct-22 Nov-22 Dec-22

BoC meeting dates

Note: As of 05/13/2022. Source: Bloomberg, RBC GAM



### Historical tightening cycles frequently end in recession





## If economy starts to stall (unemployment edges even a hair higher), it is hard to avoid recession – so no path back to cooler economy




Note: As of Mar 2022. Unemployment rate is 3-month moving average. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NBER, Haver Analytics, RBC GAM




## Housing is at risk in many countries as rates rise after a big price run up; Canadian housing is particularly vulnerable to correction

#### Canadian housing drivers



Home buyer psychology – will it persist or crack




Poor housing affordability

Regulatory tightening

Note: As at 04/28/2022. Source: RBC GAM



## Canadian housing affordability is now >25% offside, and that's before rates have finished rising



Note: As of Q4 2021. Fixed floor imposes a minimum 'normal' mortgage rate in the affordability calculations, and so reveals how affordability would look at "normal" mortgage rates. Source: CREA, Statistics Canada, Haver Analytics, RBC GAM



### We anticipate weak Chinese growth this year

#### **Near-term Chinese growth headwinds**

- Severe COVID lockdowns due to zero tolerance policy
- Hit to exports as global demand for goods shifts to services
- Housing market excesses being unwound
- Corporate crackdown (disproportionately against big tech)
- China is a commodity importer
- Demographic challenges

...though the Chinese government targets +5.5% and is now pushing back with rate cuts and a new focus on "stability" for 2022



### For all of that, a soft landing remains possible

Several (though not all) of these problems must abate fairly briskly to reduce inflation and thus the amount of monetary tightening coming:

Supply chain

Financial conditions shock

Commodity shock

Pandemic / China slowdown

Simultaneously, the following variables must remain firm despite myriad headwinds:

Business cap ex and hiring

Consumer spending





### Long-term macro themes

Post-COVID changes Downtowns / work from home / online / travel

High debt Low rates, less fiscal flexibility

Government Era of big government

Workers > Businesses Higher wages, flat profit margins

Multipolar world China ascends, Russia, de-globalization, militarization

Demographics Aging + low fertility = Slow growth / lower inflation

Productivity Faster innovation?

Climate Growth neg. / inflation pos. / massive sector effects

Inflation >=2% in the future versus <=2% over prior decade



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